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I. INTRODUCTION 
A tenant who enters a lease agreement gains the right to possess 
a landlord’s property.1 Accordingly, a landlord unlawfully excludes 
a tenant if, in bad faith, the landlord prohibits the tenant from 
maintaining or recovering possession of the property.2 In Minnesota, 
a tenant who is unlawfully excluded has remedies against a landlord, 
including damages for ouster.3 Additionally, “residential tenants” 
who are “occupying” the premises may bring a petition against the 
landlord to recover possession of the leased property.4 
In Cocchiarella v. Driggs, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
in the context of a landlord-tenant relationship, the phrase “is 
occupying” encompasses the present legal right of occupancy.5 The 
Cocchiarella decision overturned the lower courts’ determinations 
1. See Geo. Benz & Sons v. Willar, 198 Minn. 311, 315, 269 N.W. 840, 842
(1936); Place v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Tr. Co., 67 Minn. 126, 129, 69 N.W. 706, 707 
(1897); Lease, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A contract by which a 
rightful possessor of real property conveys the right to use and occupy the property 
in exchange for consideration, usu. [sic] rent.”). 
2. MINN. STAT. § 504B.231(a) (2017) (stating that a landlord who “in bad faith
. . . removes, excludes, or forcibly keeps out a tenant” may be liable to the tenant 
for “[d]amages for ouster”); Bass v. Equity Residential Holdings, LLC, 849 N.W.2d 
87, 91 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014). 
3. MINN. STAT. § 504B.231 (2017); see MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 5 (2017)
(permitting “additional . . . remed[ies] for residential tenants unlawfully excluded 
or removed from rental property”). 
4. MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 12 (1999); MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv.
1(a)–(b),(e) (2017). 
5. 884 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Minn. 2016).
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that a tenant under a lease who had not yet received a key to a rental 
property, nor ever physically possessed the premises, could not bring 
a claim for unlawful exclusion under Minnesota Statute section 
504B.375.6 
This case note begins with a history of the case law and statutory 
guidelines involved in Cocchiarella.7 This note continues by discussing 
the facts and procedural history of Cocchiarella,8 followed by a 
summary of the majority and dissenting opinions.9 Next, this note 
argues that Cocchiarella’s holding conflicts with section 504B.375’s 
plain meaning, the legislature’s intent, and the statute’s underlying 
policy concerns.10 Finally, this note concludes that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court erred in ruling that a tenant without physical 
possession but who holds a present legal right under a lease is a 
“residential tenant” with the right to bring an unlawful exclusion 
petition under section 504B.375.11 
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
The Minnesota Supreme Court has pondered the requirements 
for forming a landlord-tenant relationship for over 145 years.12 
Although a lease creates a landlord-tenant relationship, the 
affiliation additionally requires the “transfer of possession and 
control of the premises.”13 Determining the timing and 
qualifications for the “transfer of possession” continues to challenge 
the statutory interpretation abilities of modern courts.14 Sections 
6. Id. at 628; Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 870 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn. Ct. App.
2015), rev’d, 884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016). 
7. See infra, Part II.
8. See infra, Part III.A.
9. See infra, Parts III.B.–C.
10. See infra, Part IV.
11. See infra, Part V.
12. See, e.g., Crosby v. Horne & Danz Co., 45 Minn. 249, 250, 47 N.W. 717, 717
(1891) (holding that defendant’s occupancy of premises did not create a landlord-
tenant relationship); Lightbody v. Truelson, 39 Minn. 310, 313–14, 40 N.W. 67, 68–
69 (1888) (stating that because a lease created a landlord-tenant relationship, the 
tenant possessed the house). 
13. Landlord-Tenant Relationship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 622 (stating that the issue before the court
was if “a person must physically occupy a dwelling in a residential building to qualify 
as a ‘residential tenant’”). 
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504B.375 and 504B.001 of the Minnesota Statutes include rental 
property terms that require accurate interpretation.15 
This section explores the history of Minnesota statutes 
pertaining to unlawful residential property exclusion.16 First, this 
section recounts the general history of the landlord-tenant 
relationship in England and the United States.17 Next, this section 
discusses occupancy and possession as evidence of tenancy in 
Minnesota case law.18 Finally, this section describes the enactment 
history and content of Minnesota Statute section 504B.375.19 
A. A General History of the Landlord-Tenant Relationship 
The English feudal system produced the landlord-tenant 
relationship around the time of the eleventh-century Norman 
Conquest.20 Farming villagers allowed “landlords” (sometimes called 
“knights”) to own their land in exchange for protection from 
robbers and “nomadic warriors.”21 The lease’s historical purpose was 
to “evade the usury laws” by exchanging the borrower’s land for the 
lender’s right to use the land to earn a profit.22 Under this system, 
the law favored landlords at the tenants’ expense.23 Although the 
development of the mortgage in the fourteenth century negated the 
15. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 (2017) (utilizing the terms “residential tenant,”
and “recover possession”); MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 12 (2017) (utilizing the 
terms “residential tenant,” “recover possession,” and “is occupying”). 
16. See infra, Part II.
17. See infra, Part II.A.
18. See infra, Part II.B.
19. See infra, Part II.C.
20. Gary Goldman, Uniform Commercial and Tenant Act—A Proposal to Reform
“Law out of Context”, 19 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 175, 180 (2002); Eloisa C. Rodriquez-
Dod, “But My Lease Isn’t Up Yet!”: Finding Fault with “No-Fault” Evictions, 35 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 839, 845 (2013). 
21. Skip Schloming, The Concept of “Landlord”: A Short History from Medieval Times
to the Present, SMALL PROP. OWNERS ASS’N (Dec. 17, 2012), https://spoa.com/the-
concept-of-landlord-a-short-history-from-medieval-times-to-the-present/. 
22. Goldman, supra note 20, at 180; see also Mary Ann Glendon, The
Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. Rev. 503, 505–06 (1982) 
(“[As] the term for years [lease] ‘began to take shape, the term was primarily used 
as ‘a common part of the machinery whereby land was gaged for money lent.’” 
(quoting 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 36, 111, 113 
(2d ed. 1923))). 
23. Goldman, supra note 20, at 180 (explaining that this early purpose created
“the law’s hostility to a tenant’s rights” because a lender’s use of a borrower’s land 
usually earned more money than lending money with interest to a borrower). 
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lease’s usury avoidance purpose, the feudal system continued to 
support landlords’ interests over tenants’ rights.24 
By the sixteenth century, leases were considered a form of 
property conveyance rather than contract formation.25 Additionally, 
the doctrines of independent covenants and caveat lessee emerged 
around this time,26 and medieval tenants leased the landlord’s 
property to farm the land.27 Accordingly, tenants did not expect 
landlords to improve or maintain any structure on the property.28 
These tenant farmers possessed the construction and repair skills 
needed to ensure their leased buildings’ habitability.29 Although 
these doctrines functioned appropriately in an agrarian society, 
urban tenants suffered under these ancient laws.30 
In contrast to their medieval rural counterparts, industrial-era 
urban tenants possessed the more specialized skills needed to 
perform urban jobs.31 Consequently, the typical urban tenant lacked 
the wide range of abilities and resources necessary to maintain a 
structure’s soundness.32 Additionally, this new breed of tenants was 
24. See Feudalism, LORDS & LADIES (2017), http://www.lordsandladies.org/
feudalism.htm (describing feudalism as a “land-based economy”); Goldman, supra 
note 20, at 180–81 (noting that this “property paradigm” allowed landlords to 
operate with “no mitigation, no obligation to act in good faith, and few, if any, 
implied terms”). 
25. Goldman, supra note 20, at 180 (adding that “the land was the primary
consideration, not the structures”). But see Glendon, supra note 22, at 505 (stating 
that the “rights under these [early] leases were treated more as contractual than 
proprietary” because they “typically had nothing to do with subsistence or shelter”). 
26. See Goldman, supra note 20, at 180–81. The doctrine of independent
covenants permitted one party to breach without requiring the other party’s 
performance. Id. at 181. The doctrine of caveat lessee allowed the landlord to lease 
his property “as is” without commitment to maintain or improve the property’s 
condition. Id.; see also, Glendon, supra note 22, at 511 (noting that “the idea of 
absolute contractual obligation” contributed to making rent action defense “doubly 
difficult for a tenant”). 
27. Schloming, supra note 21 (“Originally, then, rent was actual produce from
the land and linked entirely to the land, not to a building or a part of a building.”). 
28. Id. (stating that even if the house was destroyed, the tenant was still
responsible for the rent, because “the land was all-important”). 
29. Id.
30. See Goldman, supra note 20, at 181 (“Rules meant for farm leases were
adopted by courts in toto and applied to urban leases of multi-tenant, residential 
and commercial leases.”). 
31. Schloming, supra note 21 (“In industrial society, all workers have
specialized skills and jobs, unlike the mulit-skilled medieval farmers.”). 
32. Id. (“Urban tenants living in multiple-unit buildings do not construct those
5
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much more concerned with the structure in which they resided 
rather than the land upon which the structure stood.33 
In response to the changing residential landlord-tenant 
environment, courts sought to protect the urban tenant’s interests 
by formulating various exceptions to existing landlord-tenant law, 
including the theory of constructive eviction.34 In 1932, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a lease that is “silent as to any 
[contrary] provision” implies “that the premises will be habitable.”35 
Despite courts’ efforts to improve tenants’ positions, the doctrines of 
independent covenants and caveat lessee remained in effect until 
the late 1960s.36 
President Johnson’s “Great Society” programs bolstered a 
“landlord-tenant law revolution” in the late 1960s and early 1970s.37 
Housing acts, minimum habitability requirements, rent control 
legislation, legal aid services, and “a body of more equitable tenant-
landlord law” spread across the nation.38 During this “revolution,” 
the “entire legal relationship of residential landlord and tenant . . . 
was being fundamentally restructured through legislative and 
judicial action.”39 Additionally, several courts during this time ruled 
buildings, nor do they have the skills to deal with major problems in the heating, 
plumbing and electrical systems, nor with structural defects.”). 
33. See Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(noting that urban apartment tenants residing on the upper floors of tenement 
buildings have “little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet below”). 
34. Goldman, supra note 20, at 182; see Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727, 728
(N.Y. 1826) (“A lessor erecting an intolerable nuisance, so as to deprive the lessee 
of his enjoyment, would be equivalent to an expulsion.”) (Spencer, Sen.); 
Constructive Eviction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A landlord’s act of 
making premises unfit for occupancy, often with the result that the tenant is 
compelled to leave.”). 
35. Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 429–30, 239 N.W. 148, 149 (1931)
(concerning tenants who were forced to abandon their apartment because of “large 
numbers” of bedbugs coming from neighboring apartments under the landlord’s 
control). 
36. Goldman, supra note 20, at 183.
37. Id. During his 1964 State of the Union address, President Johnson declared
“unconditional war on poverty in America.” Alexander von Hoffman, Let Us 
Continue: Housing Policy in the Great Society, Part One 5 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud., 
Harv. Univ., Working Paper No. W09-3, 2009). 
38. Glendon, supra note 22, at 519 (explaining that the federal government
distributed federal urban renewal funds to local governments that established 
housing codes); Goldman, supra note 20, at 183; ANDREW T. CARSWELL, THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING 736 (2d. ed. 2012). 
39. Glendon, supra note 22, at 514; see Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
6
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that “leases of urban dwelling units should be interpreted and 
construed like any other contract.”40 
In 1972, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws ratified the Uniform Residential Landlord and 
Tenant Act (URLTA).41 The URLTA sought to “reorder and give a 
new balance to the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants” 
by “recogniz[ing] the modern tendency to treat performance of 
certain obligations of the parties as interdependent.”42 The URLTA 
prompted several states—including Minnesota—to adopt residential 
codes, implied warranties, and housing code violation remedies.43 In 
1974, Minnesota Statute section 504.23 became the first piece of 
Minnesota legislation to address landlord housing code violations.44 
1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that “the purposes and structure of the 
[housing] code itself” required “that the housing code must be read into housing 
contracts”); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that a 
landlord may not evict a tenant in retaliation for the tenant reporting the landlord’s 
code violations); Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 
1960) (holding that a landlord’s violation of housing regulations created sufficient 
evidence of negligence for a tort complaint); Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 
(N.H. 1973) (discarding “the rule of ‘caveat lessee’ and the doctrine of landlord 
nonliability”). 
40. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 86 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(internal quotations omitted); Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 
477, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075; Winchester Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Staten, 361 A.2d 187, 190 (D.C. 1976). 
41. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS, 1972). The Act’s purposes were to (1) “simplify, clarify, 
modernize, and revise” residential landlord-tenant law; (2) “encourage landlords 
and tenants to maintain and improve” housing conditions; and (3) to bring 
uniformity to “those states which enact it.” Id. § 1.102(a), (b)(1)–(3). 
42. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL & TENANT ACT § 1.102, Comment; Samuel Jan Brakel &
Donald M. McIntyre, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) in 
Operation: Two Reports, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 555, 560 (1980). 
43. Glendon, supra note 22, at 525 (describing an “implied warranty” as the
“covenant to pay rent and [the] covenant to provide a habitable house [that are] 
mutually dependent” (quoting Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Wis. 1961))). 
44. See MINN. STAT. § 504.23 (1974) (repealed 1998). Although a “Landlord
and Tenants” section first appeared in the Minnesota Statutes in 1905, subsections 
addressing security deposits, damages, automatic renewals, definitions, and code 
violations did not appear until 1974. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 62 (1905) (repealed 1941). 
7
Cline: Property: Preoccupation With Occupancy: Defining "Residential Ten
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
2018] STATUTORILY DEFINING  “RESIDENTIAL TENANT” 243 
B. Occupancy and Possession as Evidence of Tenancy in Minnesota Case 
Law 
In Minnesota, most decisions concerning landlord-tenant law 
appear in unpublished court of appeals decisions.45 Yet, as early as 
1868, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the creation of a 
landlord-tenant relationship as it related to “the statute of forcible 
entries and unlawful detainers.”46 Two decades later, the court found 
that occupancy did not necessarily create a landlord-tenant 
relationship.47 However, in Place v. St. Paul Title Insurance & Trust 
Company, the court determined that a tenant is one who occupies or 
temporarily possesses a landlord’s property.48 The Place court held 
that the word “tenant” is “generally used in a popular sense . . . [as] 
‘one who has the occupation or temporary possession of lands or 
tenements.’”49  
In 1888, the Lightbody v. Truelson court found that any words that 
demonstrated the lessor’s intent to transfer the right to possess a 
property to a lessee were sufficient to create a tenancy.50 Although 
the Lightbody court stated that “there is no artificial rule by which the 
contract is to be construed,” the court agreed that “the existence of 
certain things is necessary to constitute a lease,” including possession 
45. Lawrence R. McDonough, Wait a Minute! Residential Eviction Defense in 2009
Still is Much More Than “Did You Pay the Rent?”, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 762, 767 
(2009). 
46. Stewart v. Murray, 13 Minn. 426, 427 (1868) (bringing an action under the
statute of “forcible entries and unlawful detainers” to determine the right of 
possession); see MINN. STAT. § 566 (1997) (repealed 1998) (addressing forcible entry 
and unlawful detainer). 
47. See Crosby v. Horne & Danz Co., 45 Minn. 249, 250, 47 N.W. 717, 717
(1891) (showing the defendant’s occupancy of the plaintiff’s premises with the 
plaintiff’s consent was not sufficient to disallow the plaintiff from leasing the 
premises to a third-party); see also Trs. of E. Nor. Lake Norwegian Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. Froislie, 37 Minn. 447, 449–50, 35 N.W. 260, 262 (1887) 
(holding a pastor’s occupancy did not create a tenancy of years for his personal 
representative who “had no more right to the possession of the premises than any 
mere intruder”). 
48. 67 Minn. 126, 129, 69 N.W. 706, 707 (1897) (holding that an insurance
policy with the phrase “[t]enancy of the present occupants” did not include the title 
holders of a property that a second party adversely possessed). 
49. Id. (finding that the insurance policy’s “tenancy” term referred to “the
occupancy of temporary possession . . . in the popular sense in which that word is 
used”). 
50. 39 Minn. 310, 313, 40 N.W. 67, 68 (1888) (addressing a tenant who
simultaneously lived in and managed a landlord’s boardinghouse). 
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of the premises and landlord consent.51 Soon after, the court in 
Mercil v. Brouilette stated that a lawful possessor of a property may not 
forcefully enter if another party is occupying the property.52 Yet, if a 
lawful property possessor peaceably enters the property occupied by 
another party, the entry is not unlawful.53 Further, such entry 
maintains complete possession upon the party with the legal right of 
possession.54 
In 1923, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that tenants had 
legal possession, control, and responsibility of their rental 
premises.55 However, the court later clarified that “mere . . . 
possession by the tenant” was not enough to establish a landlord-
tenant relationship.56 In State v. Bowman, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that a landlord-tenant relationship exists “where one 
person occupies the premises of another . . . with [the owner’s] 
consent.”57 The Bowman court also found that a tenant is one who 
“holds or possesses [property by] any kind of right or title.”58 In 1938, 
Gates v. Herberger utilized the court’s prior descriptions of possession 
and occupancy to determine tenancy requirements.59  
51. Id. at 313–14, 68–69.
52. 66 Minn. 416, 416–18, 69 N.W. 218, 218 (1896). The plaintiff purchased an
eighty-acre property from a railway company. Id. The defendant’s family had 
occupied the property for seventeen years as trespassers “with no right to or title in 
the land.” Id. In May 1894, the plaintiff entered the property without any opposition 
from the defendant and planted a wheat crop. Id. In the same month, the plaintiff 
brought an action to evict the defendant from the property. Id. In the fall, the 
defendant entered the property and “forcibly took possession of the growing grain, 
and harvested the same.” Id. 
53. Id. (finding that the plaintiff “had the right to enter in a peaceable manner,
and when once in, in such a manner, he was not guilty of an unlawful detainer”). 
54. Id. (stating that the plaintiff “was entitled to the possession, and the
defendants were not”). 
55. See Dewar v. Minneapolis Lodge, No. 44 B.P.O.E., 155 Minn. 98, 99–100,
192 N.W. 358, 358 (1923) (distinguishing between a tenant and a lodger by 
comparing the “character of [their] possession”). 
56. Geo. Benz & Sons v. Willar, 198 Minn. 311, 315, 269 N.W. 840, 842 (1936)
(holding that an express or implied agreement was necessary to establish tenancy 
under a new landlord when a property’s ownership changed due to foreclosure). 
57. State v. Bowman, 202 Minn. 44, 46, 279 N.W. 214, 215 (1938) (determining
that a couple who lived in the defendant’s hotel and paid weekly rent for over a year 
were tenants and not hotel guests). 
58. Id.
59. Gates v. Herberger, 202 Minn. 610, 612, 279 N.W. 711, 712 (1938) (finding
that when the defendant “took possession of the premises and occupied them . . . 
[he] became indebted to plaintiff . . . in accordance with the rental agreement”). 
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C. The Enactment and Content of Minnesota Statues Section 504B.375 
The history of section 504B.375, on unlawful exclusion, spans 
almost 150 years.60 Although the early sections bear little 
resemblance to the modern statute, chapter 49 of the Minnesota 
Territorial Statutes of 1851 addresses landlord-tenant concerns.61 
The first chapter dealing exclusively with landlord-tenant law 
appeared in 1905.62 Although lacking most of section 504B.375’s 
content, Minnesota Statutes chapter 62 expanded earlier landlord-
tenant legislation to include provisions for landlord re-entry and 
tenant possession restoration after “the failure of the tenant to pay 
rent.”63  
In 1941, the Minnesota State Legislature enacted chapter 504, 
“Landlords and Tenants,” and chapter 566, “Forcible Entry and 
Unlawful Detainer.”64 These chapters remained virtually unchanged 
for the next thirty years.65 In 1971, the legislature added sections 
60. See MINN. STAT. § 49 (1851) (repealed 1858). The Minnesota Office of the
Revisor of Statutes Archives begins with the Minnesota Territorial Statues of 1851. 
Minnesota Statutes Archive, THE OFFICE OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES [hereinafter 
Archive], https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?view=archive. Although precursors 
of the 1851 statutes likely addressed landlord-tenant law, Minnesota’s 1858 entry 
into the Union minimizes earlier statutes’ relevance for this note’s purposes. See id. 
The Minnesota Territorial Statutes of 1851 did not include a separate section for 
landlord and tenant law. Id. However, chapter 49, entitled “Of Estates in Dower, by 
the Curtesy, and General Provisions Concerning Real Estate” included such sections 
as “[l]iability of persons in possession of land out of which rent is reserved,” “[h]ow 
rent recovered,” and “[w]hen joint tenant may maintain action against co-tenant.” 
Id. §§ 49.31–.32, .38. 
61. See e.g., id. § 49.33 (“Nothing . . . shall deprive landlords of any legal remedy
for the recovery of their rent.”); id. § 49.34 (setting out guidelines to “quit” a lease 
at will and its corresponding rent payment obligation); id. § 49.38 (providing a cause 
of action for a joint-tenant against his co-tenant “for receiving more than his just 
proportion of the rents or profits”). 
62. See MINN. STAT. § 62 (1905) (repealed 1941).
63. MINN. STAT. § 62.3328 (1905) (repealed 1941) (stating that the lessee “may
be restored to the possession, and hold the property according to the terms of the 
original lease” if the lessee pays the amount of rent due with interest, court costs, 
and attorney’s fees). 
64. See MINN. STAT. § 504 (1941) (repealed 1998) (utilizing various landlord-
tenant terms such as “tenant,” “untenatable tenements,” and “urban real estate” 
without including a definitions section); MINN. STAT. § 566 (1997) (repealed 1998; 
§ 566.18 repealed 2001) (describing the actions and penalties for forcible entry,
unlawful detention of lands and tenements, and possession recovery for lands and 
tenements). 
65. See MINN. STAT. § 504.10–.17 (1945) (revealing that the only change in
10
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504.18 and 504.19.66 These new sections outlined landlord 
obligations to provide implied warranties of habitability, refund 
security deposits, pay damages, and reimburse tenants’ attorney’s 
fees.67  
In 1974, chapter 566 saw changes for the first time, expanding 
from seventeen to thirty-three sections.68 Sections 566.18 to 566.33 
included “[r]emedies for tenants of substandard housing,” 
“[e]viction proceedings by owner limited,” and “[p]urpose to 
provide additional remedies.”69 Section 566.18 became the 
precursor to section 504B.001, providing the first landlord-tenant 
definitions in Minnesota statutory law.70 According to section 566.18, 
subdivision 2: 
“Tenant” means any person who is occupying a dwelling in 
a building as defined in subdivision 7, under any 
agreement, lease, or contract, whether oral or written, and 
for whatever period of time, which requires the payment of 
moneys, as rent for the use of a dwelling unit, and all other 
regular occupants of such dwelling unit . . . .71 
chapters 504 and 566 from 1941 to 1971 occurred in 1945 by dropping the 
“obsolete” sections 504.10–.17, which concerned the termination of long leases). 
66. MINN. STAT. § 504.18 (1971) (repealed 1998); MINN. STAT. § 504.19 (1971)
(repealed 1973). 
67. See MINN. STAT. § 504.19 (1971) (repealed 1973) (stating that landlords who
require damage deposits must either return the deposit to the renter or provide a 
written reason for withholding the deposit); see id. § 504.19 subdiv. 2 (providing 
attorney fees for tenants whose landlords do not return the deposit or “furnish[ ] a 
written statement as required herein” and are therefore “required to start legal 
proceedings for the recovery thereof”); see MINN. STAT. § 504.18 (1971) (repealed 
1973) (requiring lessors to covenant “[t]hat the premises . . . are fit for the use 
intended by the parties” and “[t]o keep the premises in reasonable repair”). 
68. See MINN. STAT. §§ 566.01–.33 (1997) (repealed 1998); Archive, supra note
60. This impressive number of additions to chapter 566 occurred two years after
URLTA’s enactment in 1972, providing a striking example of URLTA’s impact on 
state landlord-tenant law. See id.; Glendon, supra note 22, at 523. 
69. MINN. STAT. §§ 566.18, .28, .33 (1997) (repealed 1998).
70. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 (2017) (providing definitions for various legal
terms in chapter 504B, including “Residential tenant,” the term at issue in 
Cocchiarella); § 566.18 (defining “Tenant,” “Owner,” “Commercial tenant,” “Person,” 
“Violation,” “Building,” and “Inspector”). 
71. MINN. STAT. § 566.18 subdiv. 2. Additionally, section 504.22 included a small
“definitions” subdivision stating that “‘tenant’ shall have the meaning assigned to it 
in section 566.18.” MINN. STAT. § 504.22 subdiv. 1 (1997) (repealed 1998). 
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In 1976, chapter 504 gained a section designated “Unlawful 
ouster or exclusion; penalty.”72 Minnesota’s first “lockout” statute 
stated that “a landlord . . . who unlawfully and intentionally removes 
or excludes a tenant from lands or tenements . . . is guilty of a 
misdemeanor.”73 Section 504.25 also provided that “[t]he burden is 
upon the landlord to rebut the presumption.”74 Additionally, section 
504.25 included provisions for constructive eviction.75 Interestingly, 
the available tenant remedies in section 504.26 applied only to the 
“[u]nlawful termination of utilities.”76 Thus, no provisions giving the 
right to recover damages under sections 504.25 and 504.26 existed 
for tenants who were denied physical entry, but did not experience 
utility interruption.77 Moreover, section 504.26’s remedies were 
“additional.”78 The legislature later added section 504.255 to allow 
physically excluded tenants to recover treble damages and attorney’s 
fees.79 
The year 1976 also saw the creation of section 566.175, entitled 
“Unlawful removal or exclusion; recovery of possession.”80 Unlike 
section 504.26, section 566.175 provided remedies for tenants who 
were physically removed or excluded from their rental premises.81 
Section 566.175 included an ex parte order directing a landlord to 
72. MINN. STAT. § 504.25 (1997) (repealed 1998); Archive, supra note 60.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (adding the “interruption of electrical, heat, gas or water services . . .
with intent to unlawfully and intentionally remove or exclude the tenant” to eviction 
by physical removal or exclusion). 
76. MINN. STAT. § 504.26 (1997) (repealed 1998); Archive, supra note 60
(providing that a tenant who experienced intentional utilities interruption could 
potentially recover treble damages and attorney’s fees). 
77. Id. (describing in detail the recovery procedure for tenants who
experienced landlord utility interruption but lacking any remedy for physically 
removed or excluded tenants). 
78. See MINN. STAT. § 504.27 (1997) (repealed 1998); Archive, supra note 60
(“The remedies provided . . . are in addition to and shall not limit other rights or 
remedies available to landlords and tenants.”). 
79. See MINN. STAT. § 504.255 (1997) (repealed 1998) (adding remedies for
physically excluded tenants under section 504.25 to recover treble damages and 
attorney fees in 1984). 
80. See MINN. STAT. § 566.175 (1997) (repealed 1998); Archive, supra note 60.
81. Compare id. (providing detailed procedural instructions for physically
removed or excluded tenants to regain possession of their property), with MINN. 
STAT. § 504.26 (listing criminal and financial penalties for intentional landlord 
utility interruption). 
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immediately relinquish possession of the premises to a tenant.82 
Minnesota case law addressing sections 566.175 and 504.25 includes 
cases in which landlords removed or excluded tenants who had 
physically occupied the rental premises.83 However, no Minnesota 
court appears to have addressed a case involving a tenant who had 
never occupied the premises seeking ex parte relief under section 
566.175.84 
In 1999, the Minnesota Legislature recodified section 566.175, 
creating section 504B.375 as part of a larger house bill.85 The bill’s 
main purpose “was to consolidate, clarify, and recodify the majority 
of Minnesota housing statutes under one chapter.”86 When codifying 
section 504B.375, the legislature did not intend to make substantive 
changes to the current housing laws.87 
Section 566.175 stated that “[a]ny tenant who is unlawfully 
removed or excluded from lands or tenements which are demised 
82. See MINN. STAT. § 566.175 subdiv. 1 (b) (1997) (repealed 1998) (“If it clearly
appears . . . that the removal or exclusion was unlawful, the court shall immediately 
order that the petitioner have possession of the premises.”); Ex parte, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (describing ex parte relief as “usu[ally] for temporary or 
emergency relief”). 
83. See, e.g., Pellowski v. Burke, 686 F.2d 631, 634 n.5 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating
that under section 504.25, a landlord’s kicking down a tenant’s apartment door 
constituted forcefully regaining possession of the premises in an unlawful manner); 
Higgins v. Turnball, 381 N.W.2d 26, 27 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (addressing an appeal 
ordering a resident of a veteran’s home to return possession of his room under 
section 566.175); Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W. 145, 149 (Minn. Ct. App. 1978) (holding 
that “by changing the locks in [the tenant’s] absence,” the landlord committed an 
“intentional and unlawful exclusion of [the] tenant” under section 504.25). 
84. See Brief for Minn. Multi Housing Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5, n.3, Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016) (No. 
A14-1876) [hereinafter Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n] (“MMHA is not aware of 
any court anywhere in the United States that has extended a residential lockout 
statute to persons who never actually physically occupied the premises.”). 
85. Occhino v. Grover, 640 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); MINN. H.R.
199, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1999); Appellant’s Brief & Addendum at 19; 
Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 621 [hereinafter Appellant’s Brief]. 
86. Occhino, 640 N.W.2d at 362. Sections 504.25 and 566.175 existed in separate
chapters and under separate headings, yet functioned parallel to one another for 
thirty-three years. See MINN. STAT. §§ 504.25, 566.175 (1997) (repealed 1998). 
Combining the two sections provided courts with logically organized resources to 
address changing landlord-tenant law. See Occhino, 640 N.W.2d at 362. Compare 
MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 (2017) (defining “residential tenant”), with § 566.175 
(defining “tenant”). 
87. Occhino, 640 N.W.2d at 362; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 85, at 19.
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or let to the tenant may recover possession of the premises.”88 
However, “section 504B.375, subdivision 1, states that “[t]his section 
applies to actual or constructive removal of a residential tenant . . . 
[who] may recover possession of the premises.”89 Section 504B.001, 
subdivision 12, defines a “residential tenant” as “a person who is 
occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a lease or 
contract, whether oral or written.”90  
Section 504B.375 also allows a residential tenant to petition for 
an ex parte order to “recover possession of the premises” if the tenant 
provides (1) a description of the premises and the landlord, (2) 
evidence of unlawful exclusion and absence of a writ of recovery or 
order to vacate the premises against the tenant, and (3) a request for 
possession.91  
Two published cases appear in the legal literature concerning 
section 504B.375 on unlawful exclusion.92 In 2014, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals addressed section 504B.375 in a case involving a 
landlord ousting a tenant who physically occupied the premises.93 In 
2015, the Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that a tenant who 
paid a deposit and the first month’s rent, but did not receive the 
property’s keys or move into the premises, was not a “residential 
tenant” and could not obtain relief under section 504B.375.94 
However, Cocchiarella was the first reported case that attempted to 
apply section 504B.375 to a tenant who never physically occupied the 
premises.95 
88. MINN. STAT. § 566.175 subdiv. 1 (emphasis added).
89. MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(a) (emphasis added).
90. MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 12 (2017).
91. MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(b)(1)–(3); see Bass v. Equity Residential
Holdings, LLC, 849 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (stating that the court did 
not issue a writ of recovery of premises in an unlawful exclusion case). 
92. See Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 633 (Minn. 2016) (No. A14-
1876); Bass, 849 N.W.2d at 89. 
93. Bass, 849 N.W.2d at 89 (addressing section 504B.375 in an unlawful ouster
case, where a landlord changed the locks and threw “all of [the tenant’s] 
possessions” in a dumpster). 
94. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 870 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015)
(holding that for a “residential tenant” to obtain relief under section 504B.375, the 
tenant must have begun residing in the rental property before filing an unlawful 
exclusion petition). 
95. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson, J., dissenting); Brief for Minn.
Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 5. 
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III. THE COCCHIARELLA DECISION
A. Facts and Procedure 
In late January 2014, Mary Cocchiarella contacted Donald 
Driggs concerning a three-unit apartment building that Driggs 
advertised for rent.96 After meeting Driggs at the property and 
looking at the units, Cocchiarella told Driggs that she wanted to rent 
Unit 3.97 Although Unit 3 contained Driggs’s personal property, 
Driggs told Cocchiarella that it was available.98 At the end of the 
conversation, Driggs orally agreed to rent the unit to Cocchiarella. 99 
On February 1, 2014, Cocchiarella went to the unit “to 
determine when Driggs would ‘fill out paperwork’ and she could 
begin to move in.”100 Driggs told Cocchiarella that he needed to 
varnish the unit’s floors and that she could move in “a couple of days 
later.”101 Driggs asked Cocchiarella to return on February 3, 2014, to 
sign the lease.102 Driggs also requested that she bring $2,400 in cash 
for the security deposit and the February rent.103 On February 3, 
Cocchiarella gave Driggs the $2,400.104 After receiving the money, 
Driggs gave Cocchiarella a hand-written receipt105 “acknowledging 
the parties’ rental agreement and identifying the premises.”106 
Cocchiarella expected to move into the unit at that time.107 However, 
Driggs told Cocchiarella that he was sick and asked her to return the 
next day.108 
When Cocchiarella returned on February 4, 2014, Driggs asked 
her to obtain a co-signer.109 That evening, Cocchiarella brought her 
roommate to complete a “co-signed rental agreement.”110 When 
96. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 623.
97. Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d at 104.
98. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 623.






105. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 870 N.W.2d 103, 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), rev’d, 
884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016). 
106. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 85, at 4. 
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Cocchiarella asked when she could move into the unit, Driggs 
responded that he still needed a few days to remove his personal 
belongings.111 On February 6, Cocchiarella and her roommate 
returned to the unit to ask Driggs when she could move in.112 
However, Cocchiarella and her roommate left the premises after 
Driggs “became angry” and asked them to leave.113 On February 10, 
Driggs left Cocchiarella a voicemail, asking her to meet him at the 
unit so that he could return the security deposit.114 After speaking 
with Cocchiarella at the unit, Driggs “changed his mind” and did not 
return the security deposit or the February rent.115 Instead, Driggs 
told Cocchiarella that he would remove his belongings “in a couple 
of days” and that Cocchiarella could move in “later that week.”116  
On February 11, 2014, Cocchiarella left Driggs a voicemail 
stating that she would file a “lock-out petition” with the housing 
court if Driggs did not immediately provide Cocchiarella with the 
unit’s keys and allow her to move in.117 When Driggs failed to give 
Cocchiarella the keys, Cocchiarella claimed that Driggs had 
unlawfully excluded her from the unit.118 On February 14, 
Cocchiarella sought relief with the Hennepin County Housing 
Court.119  
Cocchiarella’s petition sought possession of the unit under 
Minnesota Statutes section 504B.375 on unlawful exclusion or 
removal.120 Additionally, Cocchiarella sought treble damages and 
attorney’s fees under section 504B.231.121 The order scheduling a 






116. Id. The facts do not state if Cocchiarella requested the keys or the return 
of her money at that time. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 870 N.W.2d 103, 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), rev’d, 
884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016). 
 120. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 623; see MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(a) 
(2017) (providing that a “residential tenant . . . may recover possession of the 
premises” if a landlord actually or constructively removes or excludes the tenant). 
 121. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 85, at 5; see MINN. STAT. § 504B.231 (2017) 
(providing that a “tenant may recover from the landlord treble damages or $500, 
whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney’s fees” when unlawfully excluded or 
removed). 
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to address the issue of whether she has standing to bring this action 
as a residential tenant as defined by Minnesota Statutes section 
504B.001, subdivision 12.’”122 
Hennepin County Housing Court Referee Harris heard the case 
on February 20, February 26, and April 23, 2014.123 At the April 
housing court hearing, Driggs appeared pro se and moved to dismiss 
Cocchiarella’s claim under section 504B.375, stating that 
Cocchiarella did not meet the statutory definition of a “residential 
tenant” under section 504B.001, subdivision 12.124 The housing 
court125 determined that Cocchiarella was not a “residential tenant” 
and recommended dismissing Cocchiarella’s unlawful exclusion 
claim.126 The district court dismissed Cocchiarella’s petition based 
on the housing court referee’s recommendation, agreeing with the 
reasoning that Cocchiarella was not a “residential tenant” because 
she “had not physically occupied the premises.”127 The Minnesota 
Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision.128 Cocchiarella 
appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted her request 
for review.129 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
Cocchiarella argued that the court should grant her recovery of 
the rental unit under section 504B.375 because she met the 
requirements for a “residential tenant” under section 504B.001, 
subdivision 12.130 Cocchiarella claimed that the statutory definition 
did not require “actual, physical occupancy of the premises” and that 
122. Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d at 104. 
123. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 85, at 5. 
124. Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d at 104. 
125. MINN. STAT. § 484.013 (2014); see Bass v. Equity Residential Holdings, LLC, 
849 N.W.2d 87, 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (“[T]he housing court is a program within 
the district court; once the district court reviews and confirms the housing court 
referee’s decision, the findings and order become the district court’s findings and 
order.”). 
 126. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 622–23; see MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 12 
(2017); MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(a) (2017). 
127. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 622; see MINN. STAT. § 504B.001(12). 
 128. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 623–24; see Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d at 106 
(stating that for a “residential tenant” to obtain relief under section 504B.375, the 
tenant must have begun residing in the rental property before filing an unlawful 
exclusion petition). 
129. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624. 
130. Id. 
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“the present legal right of occupancy [was] sufficient.”131 The issue 
before the court was determining if Cocchiarella met the statutory 
definition for “residential tenant” when she did not possess a key or 
manifest any sign of physically occupying the unit.132 The court 
reversed the dismissal of the petition and remanded the case to the 
housing court.133 
To determine if Cocchiarella was a residential tenant, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed two primary factors.134 First, the 
court focused on the word “occupy” and considered several common 
dictionary definitions to determine the word’s plain and ordinary 
meaning.135 The court determined that the common definitions did 
not adequately demonstrate whether the word “occupy” required 
physical occupancy or if a tenant could “occupy” a premises by legal 
possession alone.136 After examining the statutory and legal 
contexts,137 the court determined that the word “occupying” in 
section 504B.001, subdivision 12, had a “special or technical” 
meaning that referred to “both physical occupancy and to the legal 
right of occupancy under a residential lease.”138 
Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the lower 
courts’ position that a tenant must physically occupy the premises to 
satisfy the statutory “residential tenant” requirement.139 The court 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 628. 
134. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 627. 
135. Id. at 625 (listing common dictionary definitions of the word “occupy,” 
then changing the term in question to “occupancy,” and pursuing a technical 
meaning that supported “legal possession”). 
 136. Id. at 625–26 (determining that because the dictionary definitions failed to 
clarify if physical occupancy was required for “occupancy,” the word “occupy” had 
“a variety of meanings” that required the court to interpret the term in its statutory 
and legal contexts). 
 137. Id. at 626–27 (stating that the phrase “is occupying” found in section 
504B.001, subdivision 12, refers to a “dwelling . . . under a lease”); id. at 626 
(determining that a lease creates a tenancy, which “is commonly understood to 
mean the ‘[p]ossession or occupancy of lands, buildings, or other property by title, 
under a lease, or on payment of” (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1782 (4th ed. 2000))). The court concluded that a 
“residential tenant who ‘is occupying a dwelling’ under ‘a lease or contract’ 
therefore includes one who has the legal right of occupancy.” Cocchiarella, 884 
N.W.2d at 626. 
138. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 627. 
139. Id. 
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determined that case law did not support the physical occupancy 
requirement.140 Additionally, the court stated that requiring physical 
occupancy to form a tenancy conflicted with the definition of a 
residential building in section 504B.001, subdivision 11.141 The court 
concluded that a tenant with legal occupancy under a lease fulfilled 
the statutory requirement of a “residential tenant.”142 Because the 
court concluded that Cocchiarella was a residential tenant, the Court 
remanded the case with instruction to grant her recovery of the 
rental unit.143 
C. The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Anderson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice Gildea.144 The dissent objected to several aspects of the 
majority’s approach to statutory interpretation.145 First, the dissent 
disagreed that “occupying” was a technical term and stated that the 
majority should have interpreted the word according to its “common 
and ordinary meaning.”146 Second, Justice Anderson maintained 
that the majority violated the statutory construction rule against 
 140. Id. (following a path from “occupy” to “lease” to “tenant” in the common 
law and finding that a tenant “possesses lands or tenements by any kind of right or 
title”); see also State v. Bowman, 202 Minn. 44, 46, 279 N.W. 214, 215 (1938) (finding 
that occupancy “in subordination” to another’s title created a landlord-tenant 
relationship). 
 141. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 11(2) (2017) (providing that a 
“residential building” may be “an unoccupied building which was previously used 
. . . as a dwelling”); Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 627–28 (stating that the physical 
occupancy requirement conflicted with section 504B.001, subdivision 11(2)); id. 
(reasoning that a residential tenant could “legally occupy” an “unoccupied” 
residential building under section 5048.001, subdivisions 11 and 12). 
 142. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 628. The majority concluded that because a 
“residential tenant” could “occupy” an “unoccupied residential building” only by 
“legal occupancy,” a “landlord-tenant relationship incorporates not only physical 
occupancy, but also the present legal right of occupancy under a lease.” Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 621; id. at 628 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
145. Id. at 629 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
146. Id. 
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surplusage.147 Third, the dissent stated the statutory definition of 
“residential tenant” was sufficient to define “occupying.”148  
Additionally, Justice Anderson reasoned that Cocchiarella did 
not have legal possession, noting that the oral lease agreement “did 
not include an effective date.”149 According to the dissent, a tenant 
must demonstrate some physical manifestation of control, such as 
obtaining the property’s keys, to qualify as a “residential tenant.”150 
Further, Justice Anderson said that allowing tenants who “merely 
claim[ed] a present legal right to occupancy” to receive relief under 
section 504B.395 was inconsistent with the statute’s legislative intent 
and public policy.151 
IV. ANALYSIS
The analysis section begins by addressing the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the term “residential tenant” in sections 504B.375 and 
504B.001 of the Minnesota Statutes, focusing on the court’s 
divergence from the canons of statutory construction.152 The analysis 
continues by examining the Minnesota State Legislature’s intent 
behind section 504B.375.153 Particularly, it examines tenants without 
physical possession of property, arguing that the Cocchiarella decision 
conflicts with the statute’s intent, including the statute’s summary 
nature, absence of contradictions to other sections, requirement for 
no writ of recovery, and purposes.154 Finally, this section discusses 
the policy and enforcement issues generated by the court’s 
 147. Id. at 631 (stating that the majority’s definition of a “residential tenant” as 
one who “merely . . . executes a lease agreement” violated the rule against 
surplusage by failing to give effect to the phrase “is occupying” in section 504B.001, 
subdivision 12); see Surplusage Canon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“[E]very word and every provision in a legal instrument is to be given effect.”). 
148. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 631 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 149. See id. at 633 n.4 (noting that the parties never established a firm move-in 
date). But cf. id. at 623 (majority opinion) (stating that Cocchiarella paid Driggs 
$2,400 on February 3, 2014, for “the February rent”). 
150. Id. at 632 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
151. Id. at 632–33. Justice Anderson stated that because “lockout statute” affords 
the tenant relief “without an opportunity for the landlord to object or respond,” the 
legislature only intended such a remedy to “dispossessed tenants who were actually 
‘occupying’ a residential unit by physical presence or control.” Id. at 633. 
152. See infra, Part IV.A. 
153. See id. Part IV.B. 
154. See id. 
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interpretation of section 504B.001, subdivision 12.155 Cocchiarella’s 
holding creates potential policy and practical concerns with which 
courts, landlords, tenants, and law enforcement officials may have to 
contend.156 
A. Section 504B.001’s Plain and Ordinary Meaning Unambiguously 
Defines the Term “Residential Tenant”
According to the Minnesota canons of statutory construction, 
courts should construe terms “according to their common and 
approved usage.”157 Technical words that have “acquired a special 
meaning . . . are construed according to such special meaning.”158 
Additionally, a phrase may be separated into “its ‘component terms’ 
and then reconstruct[ed] . . . to determine its meaning.”159 However, 
this interpretation method only applies if the term “lacks a technical 
meaning.”160  
The Cocchiarella majority began its interpretation of the term 
“residential tenant” by listing the meanings of the phrase “is 
occupying” according to common dictionaries.161 The court found 
that the first two dictionary meanings for “occupy” were “[t]o fill up 
[time or space]” and “[t]o dwell or reside in.”162 However, the court 
chose not to accept these common dictionary definitions and instead 
turned to the “derivative word ‘occupancy.’”163 The court utilized 
155. See infra, Part IV.C. 
156. See id. 
157. MINN STAT. § 645.08 subdiv. 1 (2017); accord State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 
556 (Minn. 2017) (reviewing issues of statutory interpretation de novo by giving 
“words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning”); Jaeger v. Palladium 
Holdings, 884 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Minn. 2016) (“When a statute or a rule does not 
contain a definition of a word or phrase, we look to the ‘common dictionary 
definition of the word or phrase’ to discover its ‘plain and ordinary meaning.’” 
(citing State v. Brown, 792 N.W.2d 815, 822 (Minn. 2011))). 
 158. MINN STAT. § 645.08 subdiv. 1; see In re Welfare of J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d 260, 
266 (Minn. 2013) (“The canons of construction provide that technical words and 
phrases be given their special or defined meaning.” (citing Staab v. Diocese of St. 
Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012))). 
159. Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 605. 
160. Id. 
161. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 625; see also MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 
12 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(b) (2017). 
 162. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1215 (4th ed. 2000)). 
 163. Id. Immediately after providing five common language definitions of “to 
occupy,” the court turned to defining “occupancy.” Id. The majority opinion offered 
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Black’s Law Dictionary to define “occupancy” as “condition of 
holding.”164 Then, the court returned to the common dictionary to 
define “holding” as “to be the legal possessor of.”165 Despite this 
research, the court felt unable to determine if the plain and ordinary 
meaning of “occupy” required physical possession of the premises or 
if the present right of legal occupancy would suffice.166 Thus, the 
majority disregarded the plain language interpretation to seek a 
definition “lending some support to an interpretation . . . that 
include[d] legal possession.”167 
After abandoning its plain language interpretation,168 the court 
embarked on a circular, convoluted, and poorly supported path to 
interpret “occupy” as a technical term. 169 First, the majority stated 
that “is occupying” refers to a lease that creates a tenancy that creates 
no motive for looking beyond the infinitive verb form contained in the statute. Id.; 
see MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 12. Instead, the court proceeded to 
comprehensively define a term not found in the statute. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 
625–26; see MINN. STAT. § 504.001 subdiv. 12; MINN. STAT. § 504B.375. 
 164. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Occupancy, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). The majority quoted Black’s definition as “[t]he act, 
state, or condition of holding, possessing, or residing in or on something; actual 
possession residence or tenancy esp. of a dwelling or land.” Id. Although this 
definition included several other gerunds, the court chose to isolate “holding” in 
continuing the effort to define “is occupying.” See id. 
 165. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1215 (4th ed. 2000) (“‘Hold[ing],’ in turn, 
can be defined as ‘[t]o be the legal possessor of,’ lending some support to an 
interpretation of ‘occupying’ that includes legal possession.”). The court provided 
no explanation for first utilizing a common dictionary to define “occupy,” switching 
to Black’s to define “occupancy,” and then returning to the same common dictionary 
to define “holding.” See id. 
 166. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 625–26 (concluding that the dictionary 
definitions did not determine if “‘is occupying’ refers only to physical occupancy, 
or whether it also includes the present legal right of occupancy”). 
 167. See id. at 625 (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 836 (4th ed. 2000)). 
168. See id. at 625–26. 
 169. Compare Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624 (citing Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 
813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012) (reversing the canon of construction order found 
in section 645.08(1) by stating first that “we construe technical words and phrases 
‘according to [their] special meaning,’” before mentioning that “[we construe] 
other words and phrases according to their ‘common and approved usage’’’), with 
MINN. STAT. § 645.08(1) (2017) (directing first the construction of words according 
to their “common and approved usage” before discussing the construction of 
“technical words and phrases”). 
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a “legal right of occupancy.”170 Next, the court determined that its 
“legal right of occupancy” theory conferred a technical meaning on 
the term “is occupying.”171 The court supported its technical 
meaning assessment by determining that the term “residential 
tenant” does not have a “physical occupancy requirement” because 
a “residential building” may be, at some point, “unoccupied.”172  
In contrast, the three lower courts resisted the temptation to 
apply the common law or a technical meaning to the term “is 
occupying.”173 The lower courts correctly maintained the statutory 
construction boundaries by not applying a word’s common law 
definition “if the statute provides its own definition.”174 Granted, the 
statutory definition here contains the term in question.175 Yet, the 
Cocchiarella court gave no clear reasoning for determining that the 
term “is occupying” had a “variety of meanings” that required the 
court to advance to the next interpretation step.176 
 170. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 626 (“[T]he phrase ‘is occupying’ refers to ‘a 
dwelling in a residential building under a lease or contract.’”). 
 171. Id. at 627 (stating “occupying” had a “definite and well-understood special 
or technical meaning in the context of the landlord-tenant relationship”); see MINN. 
STAT. § 645.08(1). 
 172. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 627; see MINN. STAT. § 504B.001, subdivs. 11, 12 
(2017). Minnesota Statutes section 504B.001 subdivision 11 contains two definitions 
for the term “residential building.” MINN. STAT. § 504B.001, subdiv. 11. Subdivision 
11’s first definition describes a “residential building” as a “building used . . . as a 
dwelling . . . multi-family units such as apartments.” Id. § 504B.001, subdiv. 11(1). 
Subdivision 11’s second definition states that a “residential building” may be “an 
unoccupied building which was previously used in whole or in part as a dwelling 
and which constitutes a nuisance under section 561.01.” Id. The disjunctive nature 
of the subdivision is evidenced by the word “or” separating subsections 1 and 2. See 
id. Since Driggs was occupying the building and no reason existed to believe that 
the building constituted a nuisance, the court’s reliance on subdivision 11, 
subsection 2 to define a “residential building” is illogical and irrelevant to the case 
at hand. See id. 
 173. See Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d at 106 (noting that Cocchiarella “relie[d] on 
case law” to define the landlord-tenant relationship). 
 174. Id. at 106 (contrasting Cocchiarella’s interpretive approach to the appellate 
court’s “obligat[ion] to apply the statutory definition of the term ‘residential 
tenant,’ which is the term used in section 504B.375” (quoting State v. Schmid, 859 
N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 2015))). 
175. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.001, subdiv. 12. 
 176. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 625 (including additional terms in its plain 
meaning analysis, such as “occupancy” and “holding,” and then concluding that the 
term “occupying” possessed a “variety of meanings”). 
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The court provided no explanation for first utilizing a common 
dictionary to define “occupy,” switching to Black’s to define 
occupancy,” and then returning to the same common dictionary to 
define “holding.”177 Moreover, the court sought to define 
“occupying” as a technical term by nominalizing the word to 
“occupancy.”178 Transforming the term “is occupying” to the 
derivative word “occupancy” involved breaking the term into its 
components.179 But the Minnesota Supreme Court had previously 
held that a court may only break a phrase into “component terms” if 
the phrase “lacks a technical meaning.”180 Consequently, the court 
violated its own supporting rule concerning “component terms” by 
applying the rule to a term the court itself deemed to be 
“technical.”181 
Section 504B.001’s clear definition of “residential tenant” 
provided guidance for interpreting section 504B.375 for seventeen 
years.182 Accordingly, no reported Minnesota case before Cocchiarella 
addressed the issue of a tenant without physical possession seeking 
ex parte under section 504B.375.183 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court erred by rejecting the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
phrase “is occupying” in section 504B.001, subdivision 12.184 
 177. See id. (stating the court consulted Black’s Law Dictionary to define 
“occupancy”). 
 178. See id. (moving from defining “occupying” to “occupancy” after listing 
common definitions of “occupying”). 
 179. See id. The court supports defining “occupancy” to interpret the statutory 
phrase “is occupying” based on the “separate-and-reconstruct method” found in 
Jaeger. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, 884 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Minn. 2016); see also PAUL
R. KROEGER, ANALYZING GRAMMAR: AN INTRODUCTION 248 (2005) (“A stem is the part 
of the word that contains . . . the root plus any derivational morphology.”). 
180. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 605. 
 181. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 605 (stating the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
determination that a court may break a phrase into “component terms” if the phrase 
“lacks a technical meaning”). 
182. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 12 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 
(2017). 
 183. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson J., dissenting) (“In the two 
decades since the lockout statue was enacted, there is no reported decision from a 
Minnesota court . . . ever allowing a lockout petition to proceed on the basis of a 
disputed lease agreement and no actual occupation of a residential building.”); 
Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 5 (being unaware of any case in 
the United States involving a tenant without physical possession seeking relief under 
a “residential lockout statute”). 
 184. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 629 (Anderson J., dissenting) (“[T]he plain 
and only reasonable meaning of the word ‘occupying,’ as used in section 504B.001, 
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B. The Reasonable Legislative Intent of Section 504B.375 Does Not 
Apply to Tenants Without Physical Possession 
In ascertaining the legislature’s intent, a court should apply 
unambiguous terms to “an existing situation” and not overlook the 
“letter of the law . . . under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”185 If a 
statute’s words are unclear, a court may determine legislative intent 
by considering the statute’s goal and “the consequences of a 
particular interpretation.”186  
1. The Court Failed to Consider the Drastic Nature of Section
504B.375: Allowing a Tenant to Obtain an Ex Parte Order
The court shall direct the order to the sheriff . . . [to] 
execute the order immediately by making a demand for 
possession on the landlord . . . . If the landlord fails to 
comply with the demand, the officer shall take whatever 
assistance may be necessary and immediately place the 
residential tenant in possession of the premises.187  
Black’s Law Dictionary describes an ex parte action as one “[d]one 
or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only.”188 
Generally, a defendant may not appeal an ex parte order.189 
Additionally, an ex parte order leaves the adverse party “without 
benefit of . . . argument or disclosure.”190 Accordingly, an ex parte 
action demanding physical possession of a rental premises is an 
subdivision 12, requires a ‘residential tenant’ to have actual, physical possession of 
the residential dwelling under a lease or contract.”). 
185. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2017). 
 186. Id. § 645.16(4), (6). The statute provides a non-exhaustive list for 
discerning legislative intent “when the words of a law are not explicit,” including 
“the occasion and necessity of the law” and “the mischief to be remedied.” Id. 
§ 645.16 subdiv. 1, (3).
187. MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(e) (2017).
188. Ex parte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
189. MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 3 (2017) (“An order issued under
subdivision 1, paragraph (c) . . . is a final order for purposes of appeal.”); accord 
State ex rel. Norris. v. Dist. Cts. 11th & 1st Jud. Dists., 52 Minn. 283, 290–91, 53 N.W. 
1157, 1158 (1893) (holding that a construction company could not appeal an ex 
parte injunction on railroad construction); BLACK’S, Ex parte, supra note 188 
(“[W]ithout notice to, or argument by, anyone having an adverse interest.”). 
 190. MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(c) (“If it clearly appears . . . that the 
exclusion or removal was unlawful, the court shall immediately order that the 
residential tenant shall have possession of the premises.”); see Norris, 52 Minn. at 
290–91, 53 N.W. at 1158; BLACK’S, Ex parte, supra note 188. 
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“extraordinary” measure designed for situations where no sufficient 
alternative remedy exists.191 Defendants must receive notification 
and the chance to be heard with regard to property forfeiture.192 
Section 504B.375 provides the petitioner with an immediate 
order to “demand . . . possession [from] the landlord.”193 The statute 
authorizes the sheriff to “take whatever assistance may be necessary” 
to restore the premises to the petitioner’s physical possession.194 The 
legislature likely did not intend to provide such a drastic remedy to 
a tenant who has alternative relief options.195  
The Cocchiarella case involves the eviction of a prior tenant with 
physical occupancy.196 However, section 504B.375 provides no 
provisions to address the eviction of a prior tenant; one who may be 
holding over, for example.197 Conversely, sections 504B.281–.371 
provide detailed guidelines for the eviction process.198 For example, 
section 504B.365 describes the “[e]xecution of the writ of recovery 
of premises and order to vacate.”199 The detail and remedies 
provided show that the legislature intended for sections 504B.281–
191. Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 10. 
 192. Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W. 2d 732, 742 (Minn. 1979) (“At a minimum the 
due process clause requires that deprivation of property be preceded by notice and 
an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the case.”). 
193. MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(e). 
194. Id. 
195. MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 5 (explaining that section’s purpose is to 
“provide an additional or summary remedy for [unlawfully excluded] residential 
tenants”); Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 15 (“Persons who 
claim to have valid leases but are not allowed to move in can maintain claims for 
breach of contract . . . .”); see Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 633 (Anderson, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the parties’ dispute was a contract issue); Brief for Minn. 
Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 10 (stating that utilizing the statute to “resolve 
a contractual dispute on a summary basis . . . is untrue to the statute’s purpose and 
intent”). 
 196. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 n.4 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“Although 
Cocchiarella knew that Driggs still physically occupied the allegedly leased dwelling, 
Cocchiarella’s counsel proposed . . . that the [housing] referee ‘enter an order 
directing . . . that Driggs must vacate the property.’”). 
 197. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 (leaving issue of evictions unaddressed); Holding 
over, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A tenant’s action in continuing to 
occupy the leased premises after the lease term has expired.”). 
 198. MINN. STAT. §§ 504B.281–.371 (2017) (providing instruction for landlords 
in dealing with eviction issues). 
199. MINN. STAT. § 504B.365 (2017). 
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.371, not section 504B.375, to authorize the eviction of tenants who 
were currently occupying a rental property.200 
The eviction instructions in section 504B.365 provide the 
occupying tenant with a twenty-four-hour notice to vacate the 
premises.201 In contrast, section 504B.375’s ex parte order demands 
that the current occupant immediately vacate the premises without 
notice.202 Despite the consequences that awaited Driggs, the majority 
opinion does not mention the effect of the statute’s “extraordinary 
nature” on the party currently occupying the premises.203 Thus, the 
court’s failure to address Driggs’s occupancy of the unit illustrates 
the majority’s lack of careful consideration concerning the ex parte 
order.204  
2. Requiring a “Residential Tenant” Under Section 504B.375 to
Physically Occupy the Premises Does Not Conflict with Chapter
504B’s Other Sections
The majority stated that requiring Cocchiarella to physically 
occupy the premises to bring an unlawful exclusion petition 
conflicted with chapter 504B’s other sections.205 Section 504B.395 
uses the term “residential tenant” to describe the procedure by 
which a tenant may obtain “relief in cases of emergency involving the 
 200. Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 504B.281–.371 (“Eviction Actions”), with MINN.
STAT. §§ 504B.375–.371 (2017) (“Resident Tenant Actions”). 
 201. MINN. STAT. § 504B.365 subdiv. 1(a) (“The officer who holds the order to 
vacate shall execute it by demanding that the defendant . . . relinquish possession 
and leave . . . the premises within 24 hours.”). 
 202. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(c), (e) (providing that “the court shall 
immediately order that the residential tenant have possession of the premises” and 
the sheriff shall “execute the order immediately”). 
 203. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 623 (stating twice that Driggs delayed 
Cocchiarella’s move-in so that he could “remove his belongings,” while failing to 
address the consequences of the ex parte order on Driggs); id. at 633 (Anderson, J., 
dissenting) (“Given the extraordinary nature of this relief, the legislature limited 
the remedies to dispossessed tenants who were actually ‘occupying’ a residential unit 
by physical presence or control—and not those who merely claim a present legal 
right of occupancy under a disputed lease agreement.”). 
 204. See id. at 632 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (noting that when a lease’s move-in 
date has not yet arrived, “a previous tenant is often legally occupying the 
dwelling . . . “). 
 205. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.395 subdiv. 1(1) (2017); Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 
627 (proposing that a tenant who discovers a lack of running water or some other 
“severe housing code violation” would be ineligible to seek a remedy under section 
504B.395 if a court utilized Driggs’s definition of “residential tenant”). 
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loss of running water, hot water, heat, electricity, sanitary facilities, 
or other essential services.”206 The court presented section 504B.395, 
concerning procedure for landlord-tenant actions, as an example of 
legislative intent in conflict with Driggs’s “residential tenant” 
definition.207  Yet, the court did not attempt to claim that Driggs 
denied Cocchiarella any of the “essential services” listed in section 
504B.395.208  
Cocchiarella’s ineligibility to recover under section 504B.375 on 
unlawful exclusions did not prevent her from obtaining relief 
through other measures.209 Section 504B.375 states that its purpose 
is “to provide an additional and summary remedy for residential 
tenants unlawfully excluded or removed from rental property.”210 
Moreover, a leaseholder who is ineligible for relief under section 
504B.375 has alternate remedies available,211 including a breach of 
contract claim.212  
The inclusion of a “tenant” in section 504B.231 and a 
“residential tenant” in section 504B.375 indicates the legislature’s 
intended distinctive purposes for each section.213 The two terms’ 
distinguishing statutory definitions demonstrate that the legislature 
did not intend for all sections of chapter 504B to apply to lease 
206. MINN. STAT. § 504B.395 subdiv. 1(1). 
207. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 627. 
208. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.395 subdiv. 1(1); MINN. STAT. § 504B.381 subdiv. 1 
(2017); Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 627. 
 209. Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d at 107–08 (“Neither the housing court referee nor 
the district court judge stated a that a claim for damages under section 504B.231 is 
viable only if a tenant has prevailed on a claim for possession under section 
504B.375.”). 
210. MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 5 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 211. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.231 (2017). Section 504B.231, “Damages for 
Ouster,” provides “treble damages or $500, whichever is greater, and reasonable 
attorney’s fees.” Id. 
212. MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 5 (stating the “additional” nature of the 
statute’s provisions); see Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 633 (Anderson, J., dissenting) 
(“The circumstances of this case, which essentially presents a contract dispute, are 
better suited for other, less extraordinary legal avenues, such as a civil suit for 
specific performance of a contract, in which both parties may be heard.”); Brief for 
Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 15 (“Persons who claim to have valid 
leases but are not allowed to move in can maintain claims for breach of contract 
and, perhaps, seek specific performance.”). 
 213. Compare MINN. STAT. § 504B.231(a) (employing the term “tenant”), with 
MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 12 (2017) (employing the term “residential tenant”). 
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holders in every phase of tenancy.214 Accordingly, the court of 
appeals ruled that Cocchiarella was a “tenant” under 504B.231 and 
remanded her claim for bad faith damages to the district court.215 
Because Cocchiarella’s lack of physical occupancy did not prevent 
her from obtaining relief under chapter 504B, the lower courts’ 
interpretation of “residential tenant” did not conflict with chapter 
504B as a whole.216 
3. Section 504B.375, Subdivision 1(b)(2)’s Requirement for No Writ
of Recovery Assumes That an Ousted “Residential Tenant”
Previously Maintained Physical Occupancy
To file a claim for unlawful removal or exclusion, a “residential 
tenant,” under section 504B.375 must demonstrate that no writ of 
recovery was issued and executed.217 In Hennepin County, 
Minnesota, a writ of recovery orders the sheriff “to compel someone 
to vacate certain specifically described premises” and to “move the 
person out, by force, if necessary.”218 Additionally, the Minnesota 
Practice Series writ of recovery form orders the sheriff to “cause [the 
tenant] to be immediately removed from the premises.”219  
In submitting her first verified petition for possession, 
Cocchiarella requested an order to allow her to “immediately move 
back into the property,” despite the undisputed fact that she “had 
 214. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 12; MINN. STAT. § 504B.231(a); see also 
Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 632 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (stating that because legal 
possession does not begin before the lease’s move-in date, even a “residential 
tenant” under the majority’s definition “must wait until the move-in date . . . to 
allege a housing code violation”). 
 215. Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d at 108.; see MINN. STAT. § 504B.231(a) (utilizing the 
term “tenant”). 
216. See Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d at 108. 
 217. MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(b) (“The residential tenant shall present 
a verified petition . . . including a statement that no writ of recovery of the premises 
and order to vacate has been issued under section 504B.345 in favor of the landlord 
and against the residential tenant and executed in accordance with section 
504B.365 . . . .”). 
218. Writ of Recovery of Premises and Order to Vacate, EXPERTGLOSSARY, 
http://www.expertglossary.com/law/definition/writ-of-recovery-of-premises-and-
order-to-vacate (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) (emphasis added); see Vacate, THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016) (“To 
cease to occupy (a lodging or place); leave: vacate an apartment.” (emphasis added)). 
219. RICHARD S. GILLMAN, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES, METHODS OF PRACTICE
§ 54.73 (3d ed. 2016) (emphasis added).
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never moved in to begin with.”220 Cocchiarella’s error in completing 
the lockout petition may reflect her inaccurate understanding of 
section 504B.375’s purpose.221 The inclusion of 504B.375’s 
requirement that no writ of recovery exists against the tenant speaks 
to the legislature’s assumption that only tenants with physical 
possession would seek to recover possession after an unlawful 
removal or exclusion.222 
4. The Court’s Definition of “Residential Tenant” Opposed the
Legislature’s Purposes
Section 504B.375’s statutory purpose is to discourage sudden 
and unjust lockouts.223 Granting Cocchiarella physical possession of 
the premises would require evicting Driggs from the unit.224 Evicting 
Driggs from Unit 3, under section 504B.375, would force a tenant 
 220. Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 13 n.9; see Verified 
Petition for Possession of Residential Rental Property Following Unlawful Removal 
or Exclusion, Minnesota Judicial Branch (2015), [hereinafter Verified Lockout 
Petition], http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/CourtForms/HOU702. 
pdf?ext=.pdf. This boilerplate form provides several options from which a petitioner 
may “ask the court to order one or more” directives to the defendant or county 
sheriff. Id. 
 221. See Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 13 n.9 (stating that 
Cocchiarella filed two Verified Petitions, the first which requested an order allowing 
Cocchiarella to “move back in the property” (emphasis added)); Verified Lockout 
Petition, supra note 220. 
 222. Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 8 (“Plainly, this 
certification is directed at those who were actually physically occupying the premises 
in some fashion before they were removed or excluded from the premises.”). 
 223. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdivs. 1(e), 23(1)–(3) (2017) (listing the 
statute’s negative consequences for a landlord who unlawfully removes or excludes 
a tenant, including: demanding immediate relinquishment of the property, 
requiring the landlord to obtain dissolution or modification of the order through a 
written motion and notice, and stating the order’s finality); see also Cocchirella, 884 
N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“Given the extraordinary nature of this 
relief, the legislature limited the remedies to dispossessed tenants who were actually 
“occupying” a residential unit by physical presence or control—and not those who 
merely claim a present legal right of occupancy under a disputed lease 
agreement.”). 
 224. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 623 (noting that when viewing the units, 
Cocchiarella “noticed that Driggs had personal property inside of Unit 3–—the unit 
at issue here”); id. (stating that Driggs’s property would still be located inside Unit 
3 for “a couple of days” after Cocchiarella and Drigg’s last verbal communication 
on February 10, 2014). 
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out of their property to allow a non-occupying tenant to gain 
possession over the premises.225  
No evidence exists that Cocchiarella was desperate for housing 
or that Driggs prevented Cocchiarella from accessing her 
belongings.226 Cocchiarella’s having a “roommate” suggests that 
Cocchiarella had a place to live during this time.227 Additionally, 
Cocchiarella continued to leave and return to the unit, “expect[ing] 
to move in.”228 Moreover, Cocchiarella made no mention of 
homelessness, lack of storage space for possessions, or any other 
situation requiring immediate resolution.229 
Conversely, the court’s decision threatened Driggs’s personal 
property and possibly his residence by granting Cocchiarella physical 
possession of the unit.230 While the facts do not prove that Driggs was 
residing in the unit, Driggs possessed a unit key and stored his 
personal property there.231 Accordingly, Driggs, not Cocchiarella, 
was the party “occupying” the premises.232 The absence of statutory 
provisions concerning third parties demonstrates the legislature’s 
 225. See id. (noting that Cocchiarella “did not hold a key or otherwise physically 
occupy the premises”). 
 226. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 623; Brief for HOME Line as Amicus Curiae 
Supp. Appellant at 9, Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016) (No. 
A14-1876) [hereinafter Brief for HOME Line] (stating that victims of unlawful 
residential housing exclusion may experience homelessness and a resulting lack of 
storage for personal property). 
 227. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 623 (stating that Cocchiarella met Driggs 




230. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(e) (2017) (directing the sheriff to 
“take whatever assistance may be necessary . . . [to] place the residential tenant in 
possession of the premises”). 
 231. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 623 (stating that Driggs “had personal property 
inside of Unit 3” and that Driggs’s “belongings” were in the unit, but not clarifying 
if Driggs lived in the unit). 
 231. See id. (stating that Cocchiarella insisted that Driggs provide her with the 
unit’s keys). 
 232. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.001 subdiv. 12 (2017) (defining a “residential 
tenant” under section 504B.375 as “a person who is occupying” the premises); Place 
v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Tr. Co., 67 Minn. 126, 129, 69 N.W. 706, 707 (1897)
(determining that the tenancy in a title insurance policy “was that which [had] 
arisen through occupation” and did not include the plaintiffs who “were not the 
owners . . . nor [who] were [ ] in possession”). 
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intent to address only two parties.233 The court opposed section 
504B.375’s purpose by labeling Cocchiarella the “residential tenant” 
of Unit 3 while Driggs physically occupied the premises.234 
Accordingly, when remanded, the court of appeals granted 
Cocchiarella appropriate relief within the statute’s legislative 
intent.235 In contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to 
appropriately apply the legislature’s intent by determining that she 
satisfied the requirements of a “residential tenant” under section 
504B.375.236 
C. Applying Section 504B.375 to Tenants Without Physical Possession 
Creates Policy and Enforcement Concerns 
A state’s legislature determines its public policy, and courts must 
not intrude on that function.237 Citizens should direct concerns 
about a statute to the legislature, not the courts.238 Perhaps the 
Minnesota Supreme Court hoped that the Cocchiarella ruling would 
prevent landlords from taking deposit money and rent from 
multiple tenants for the same property.239 Although addressing this 
 233. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(e); see also Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. 
Ass’n, supra note 84, at 13 (stating that the scenario of a tenant with legal possession 
petitioning for physical possession of a property in which a current tenant is residing 
is “not just a theoretical or remote risk”). 
 234. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The lockout 
statute is designed . . . for residential tenants who are dispossessed (e.g., locked out) 
of the homes that they actually occupied.”). 
 235. See Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d 103, 107–08 (finding that the district court 
erred by not “addressing and resolving Cocchiarella’s claim for damages under 
section 504B.231,” but “did not err by dismissing Cocchiarella’s claim for possession 
pursuant to section 504B.375.”). 
 236. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
lockout statute is inapplicable to Cocchiarella, who was never ‘occupying’ the 
residential dwelling.”). 
 237. See Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn. 2001) (“[T]he obligation 
of the judiciary in construing legislation is to give meaning to words accorded by 
common experience and understanding, to go beyond the parameters of a 
legislative enactment would amount to an intrusion upon the policy-making 
function of the legislature.”); see also Mattson v. Flynn, 216 Minn. 354, 363, 13 
N.W.2d 11, 16 (1944) (“Practical construction is not conclusive or binding upon the 
courts . . . if it is erroneous or does not carry out the intention of the legislature, or 
where the construction extends or modifies the provisions of the statute.”). 
 238. See In re Welfare of M.L.M., 813 N.W.2d 26, 35 (Minn. 2012) (quoting 
Irongate Enters., Inc. v. Cty. of St. Louis, 736 N.W.2d 326, 331 (Minn. 2007)). 
239. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 622 (noting that after receiving a security 
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problem should be a priority,240 the courtroom is not the place to fill 
voids in statutory law.241 Manipulating a statute’s interpretation can 
lead to results that the legislature never intended.242 Accordingly, 
courts may interpret a legislature’s intent by considering “the 
consequences of a particular interpretation.”243 However, courts may 
not interpret statutes to achieve desirable results that “conflict with 
the expressed will of the legislature.”244  
1. Cocchiarella’s Holding Generates Unprecedented Policy Concerns
The court failed to recognize the impact of applying section 
504B.375 to a tenant who never physically occupied a rental 
premises.245 Nor did the majority’s opinion emphasize the policy 
deposit and the first month’s rent from Cocchiarella, Driggs refused to “deliver 
physical possession of the premises to her”); see also Brief for HOME Line, supra 
note 226, at 9 (stating that every year, HOME Line receives calls from renters whose 
landlords have locked them out after the renters have signed a lease and not yet 
moved in); Lawrence McDonough, Pro Bono Counsel, Dorsey and Whitney, LLP, 
Address to the Washington County Bar Association: Residential Landlord and 
Tenant   
Law: Tips From Over 30 Years in the Trenches 41 (Dec. 14, 2016) 
(PowerPointpresen 
tation), https://www.washcolib.org/DocumentCenter/View/497) [hereinafter 
McDonough, Tips] (“This is a common practice among slumlords who take rent 
and deposits from several tenants for the same unit with the expectation that 
excluded tenants will not take action.”). 
 240. See Brief for HOME Line, supra note 226, at 9 (listing challenges that 
unlawfully excluded tenants face including: “interruption[s] in [the moving] 
process,” uncertainty surrounding the tenants’ living situations, storage of personal 
belongings, and potential homelessness). 
 241. See McNeice v. City of Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 142, 147, 84 N.W.2d 232, 
236–27 (1957) (stating that acknowledging gambling as a valid social concern did 
not allow the court to interpret a statute to ban pinball machines as gambling 
devices); see also Mattson, 216 Minn. at 363, 13 N.W.2d at 16 (“[The] public policy 
of a state is for the legislature to determine and not the courts.”). 
 242. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16(6) (2017). See generally McNeice, 250 Minn. 142, at 
147, 84 N.W.2d at 236–27 (1957). 
243. MINN. STAT. § 645.16(6) (2017). 
 244. McNeice, 250 Minn. at 147, 84 N.W.2d at 236–37 (“It is not for the court to 
encroach upon the legislative field by an interpretation which would in effect 
rewrite a statute so as to accomplish a result which might be desirable and at the 
same time conflict with the expressed will of the legislature.”). 
245. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 622–28 (making no mention of the absence 
of previous cases concerning 504B.375’s application to non-occupying tenants); id. 
at 633 (Anderson J., dissenting) (noting the original nature of the court’s decision); 
Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 5 (“[No] Minnesota court has 
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issues raised by Cocchiarella, despite ample concerns voiced from 
community members on both sides.246 For example, an amicus 
curiae brief supporting Cocchiarella stated that each year, landlords 
refuse to allow tenants who have signed a lease to physically occupy 
a rental premises.247 In contract, an amicus brief supporting Driggs 
expressed concern that landlords would have to “house a person 
who may have gained possession by fraud” and “incur the expense 
of an eviction action to remove a person who was not a tenant to 
begin with.”248 Nonetheless, the court’s opinion is silent on these 
conflicting, yet critical issues.249  
The difficulties the residential rental community currently faces 
did not exist before the Cocchiarella decision.250 Now, any person 
claiming to have an oral lease could obtain an ex parte order under 
section 504B.375 to obtain “immediate possession of the 
premises.”251 Although a statutory void exists in this area of landlord-
tenant law, Cocchiarella incorrectly applied section 504B.375 by 
offering no leeway for situations delaying a tenant’s occupancy that 
are beyond a landlord’s control.252 This creates a situation which the 
applied [the lockout statute] where the tenant never once physically occupied the 
premises.”). 
 246. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 627 (failing to mention policy concerns 
beyond the requirement that a “residential tenant” must physically occupy the 
property “is unreasonable” due to potential “conflicts with other provisions of 
chapter 504B”); id. at 632 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (discussing “policy matter[s]”); 
Brief for HOME Line, supra note 226, at 11 (“[P]ublic policy also favors an 
interpretation of the term ‘occupying,’ as used within the definition of ‘residential 
tenant.’”); Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 9 (addressing 
Cocchiarella’s and HOME Line’s policy arguments). 
247. Brief for HOME Line, supra note 226, at 9. 
248. Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 10. 
249. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 628 (reversing the dismissal of the petition 
and remanding the case to housing court without addressing policy concerns). 
 250. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 632 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[The] court’s 
decision introduces a host of potential problems.”); Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. 
Ass’n, supra note 84, at 12 (stating Cocchiarella’s broad interpretation of section 
504B.375 “would also raise a host of practical concerns for landlords”). 
 251. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(b) (2017) (stating a tenant may 
immediately occupy the property if the tenant (1) submits a petition or affidavit that 
“describes the premises and the landlord;” (2) “specifically states . . . that the 
exclusion or removal was unlawful;” and (3) “asks for possession”); Brief for Minn. 
Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 12 (noting a tenant need only fulfill easily-met 
conditions under section 504B.375 to gain physical possession of a rental property). 
 252. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16(6) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(c) 
(“[T]he court shall immediately order that the residential tenant have possession of 
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legislature never intended.253 The Cocchiarella decision has 
generated an entirely new class of public policy issues.254  
2. Cocchiarella’s Decision Produces Complex Practical Concerns with
Potentially Disastrous Results
Because the lockout statute applies to tenants who are physically 
occupying their homes, section 504B.375 lacks provisions addressing 
more than two parties.255 Yet, the Cocchiarella decision permits a 
previous tenant to lose possession of their home without notice.256 
For example, a tenant without keys or a move-in date may 
successfully petition a Minnesota court to have a previous tenant who 
is holding over summarily evicted from their home. 257 Although the 
Cocchiarella case involves only two parties, Driggs is both a landlord 
and pre-existing tenant.258 The majority’s decision does not address 
the premises” without including exceptions for circumstances beyond the 
landlord’s control); Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 12 (“[T]he 
statute provides no exception for . . . circumstances . . . beyond the landlord’s 
control.”). 
253. See id. 
254. Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 12. 
255. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 (describing only actions concerning the 
residential tenant and the landlord); Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 
84, at 14 (“The statute solves these practical problems by requiring that the person 
seeking to recover immediate possession establish actual, physical occupancy . . . .”); 
see also Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“An actual-
possession approach avoids the threat of simultaneous occupancy because only one 
party has standing to bring a lockout petition based on current, physical possession 
of the residential dwelling.”). 
 256. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(c) (providing a petitioning tenant with 
immediate “possession of the premises”); see also Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 n.4 
(Anderson, J., dissenting) (“Had the [housing] referee agreed to such an order, 
Driggs would have been summarily evicted from his own dwelling.”); Brief for Minn. 
Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 14 (noting that permitting a non-occupying 
tenant to recover under section 504B.375 would allow Driggs to be removed “from 
his own home in a summary proceeding”). 
 257. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(c) (requiring a petitioner only to 
present a “verified petition” to grant the petitioner “possession of the premises”); 
Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 624–25 (recognizing that Cocchiarella did not “hold a 
key or otherwise physically occupy the premises”); id. at 632 (Anderson, J., 
dissenting) (“[B]efore the move-in date, a previous tenant is often still legally 
occupying the dwelling, despite the execution of a lease agreement with a new 
prospective tenant that includes a future move-in date.”). 
 258. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 622–23 (acknowledging that Driggs had the 
authority to rent the unit to Cocchiarella and that Driggs kept “personal property” 
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the scenario of a tenant with physical possession of a property facing 
a sheriff with an ex parte order from a tenant who claims legal 
possession of the property.259 Thus, the majority’s interpretation of 
“residential tenant” produces “potential simultaneous ‘occupancy’ 
disputes.”260 
Similarly, the Cocchiarella decision provides an avenue for 
landlords to evict existing tenants by manipulating the language of 
section 504B.375.261 Now, a landlord could utilize the Cocchiarella 
decision to petition the court to summarily evict a current occupying 
tenant.262 Because the statute does not require notice, the tenant 
with physical possession may be unaware of the action and fail to 
contest the petition.263 Consequently, the court issuing the ex parte 
and “his belongings” in the unit). 
 259. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(e) (describing the methods by which 
the sheriff is to procure possession from the landlord); Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 
627–28 (summarizing the primary reasons for the Court’s decision without 
addressing the potential for simultaneous occupancies); Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. 
Ass’n, supra note 84, at 13 (stating that “the statute would have provided no 
guidance to the sheriff” if the district court had given Cocchiarella possession of the 
unit). 
 260. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he mere 
requirement of ‘the present legal possession’ . . . introduces a host of potential 
problems.”); Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 13 (“[T]his case 
demonstrates the confusion that will arise if tenants who have ‘legal’ but not 
‘physical’ occupancy may file lockout petitions.”). 
 261. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(a) (“A residential tenant to whom this 
section applies may recover possession of the premises as described in paragraphs 
(b) to (e).”); Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (wondering 
if two tenants claiming legal possession of the same property could now petition the 
court at the same time for summary possession of the property); Brief for Minn. 
Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 13 (noting that “[a] petitioner who cannot take 
physical possession of a unit because the prior tenant is holding over most certainly 
will argue that . . . the petitioner is entitled to relief” even though the petitioner has 
“never taken possession”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND
TENANTS § 14.1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (stating that although “both the landlord and 
an incoming tenant should have standing to bring the summary process . . . against 
the holdover,” the applicable statute is one for “forcible detainer” requiring notice 
to holdover tenant). 
 262. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(b)–(c) (describing the petitioning 
process and the court’s authority to order an ex parte order based if it “clearly 
appears . . . that the exclusion or removal was unlawful”); Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d 
at 633 n.4 (stating that “there is no reason why” a tenant with a legal right of 
occupancy “must present physical evidence such as possession of the keys or 
placement of items within the premises to exercise her legal rights”). 
263. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(c), (e) (stating that “the court shall 
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order may not even realize that a third party is occupying the 
premises.264 Thus, the Cocchiarella decision may invite absurd 
outcomes from statutory misapplication.265  
Finally, the court’s interpretation of section 504.375 fails to 
guide law enforcement officers in situations involving a third 
party.266 In the Cocchiarella case, the court offered no instructions to 
the sheriff as to “what to do with Driggs.”267 Requiring law 
enforcement officers to summarily evict a current occupant 
contradicts current landlord-tenant law.268 Thus, a situation “better 
suited” for a contract dispute potentially compromises law 
enforcement’s ability to carry out their orders.269  
immediately” order the petitioner to “have possession of the premises” and that “the 
sheriff shall execute the order immediately by making a demand for possession”); 
see also Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 n.4 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Driggs had “no opportunity to respond before the order was issued”); BLACK’S, Ex 
parte, supra note 188 (stating twice that the action is “without notice” and that the 
action is “usu. [sic] for temporary or emergency relief”). 
 264. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(e) (“[If a] person in control of the 
premises cannot be found and if there is no person in charge, the officer shall 
immediately enter into and place the residential tenant in possession of the 
premises.”); see also Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 12 (“What 
becomes of the existing tenant?”). 
 265. See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2017) (“[T]he courts may be guided by the 
. . . presumptions [that] the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, 
impossible of execution, or unreasonable”); Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra 
note 84, at 17 (stating that correctly interpreting the legislature’s language in 
section 504B.375 does not “create absurd results”). 
 266. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 1(e) (containing no instructions to a 
sheriff addressing the management of a third-party currently residing in the 
property). 
 267. Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 13 (predicting 
confusion for law enforcement if a court “granted Cocchiarella’s petition” because 
although the statute states the “officer shall take whatever assistance may be 
necessary [to] immediately place the residential tenant in possession of the 
premises,” the statute does not provide the sheriff with authority to evict an existing 
tenant). 
 268. See MINN. STAT. § 504B. 365 subdiv. 1(a) (2017) (instructing the sheriff to 
provide twenty-four hours for a tenant to vacate in a writ of recovery order); UNIF. 
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 4.207 (“A landlord may not recover or take 
possession of the dwelling unit by action or otherwise . . . except in case of 
abandonment, surrender, or as permitted by this Act.”). 
 269. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson, J., dissenting); Brief for Minn. 
Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 13–14 (noting the “extreme” nature of 
Cocchiarella’s counsel’s “propos[al] that the housing court referee ‘enter an order 
directing specific performance . . . that Mr. Driggs must vacate the property.’”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Cocchiarella addressed the issue of whether an individual who 
held a present legal right of possession, but did not have a key or 
reside in the premises, was a “residential tenant” under section 
504B.375.270 The court ruled that a lease applicant who had never 
occupied a rental premises could bring an unlawful exclusion 
petition under section 504B.375 because she qualified as a 
“residential tenant” under section 504B.001.271 
The majority rejected the lower courts’ solid reasoning and 
failed to properly utilize the canons of statutory interpretation.272 
Additionally, the majority claimed to address chapter 504B as whole, 
while incorrectly interpreting the statute’s reasonable legislative 
intent.273 Finally, although the majority’s holding attempted to 
address a valid public policy concern, the court misapplied section 
504B.375.274  
The Cocchiarella decision allows a court to issue an ex parte order 
requiring a physical occupant of a premises to vacate the property in 
favor of a tenant claiming only legal possession.275 The court’s failure 
to provide guidance for Cocchiarella’s potential consequences will 
likely create confusion and frustration for Minnesota’s landlords, 
tenants, sheriffs, and courts going forward.276 
270. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d. at 625. 
271. Id. at 626. 
272. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 628; id. at 631 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
context is which this word appears shows that a common and ordinary meaning is 
intended.”). 
 273. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375 subdiv. 5 (2017); Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 627 
(“[U]pon the effective date of a lease agreement, a tenant has a right to bring an 
unlawful removal or exclusion petition under Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 12 
[sic].”). 
 274. See McDonough, Tips, supra note 239, at 41 (presenting the issue of 
landlords taking tenants’ deposit money and then refusing to allow tenants to move 
in). 
 275. See MINN. STAT. § 504B.375; Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 622–33 (Anderson, 
J., dissenting) (“Minnesota’s lockout statute . . . is appropriate only for the 
extraordinary circumstances the statute was intended to protect.”); Brief for Minn. 
Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 12. 
 276. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16(6) (2017); Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 
(Anderson, J., dissenting); Brief for Minn. Multi Hous. Ass’n, supra note 84, at 13 
(maintaining that these concerns are “not just a theoretical or remote risk”). 
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